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BU1PFALO LAW1 R9VI9W1
This rule was reaffirmed by the court in Sagorsky v. Malyon,4 an action on a
policy by insureds against the insurer of property. If the loss occurred while the
property was in or upon an automobile unattended by the insured, his permanent
employee, or a person whose sole duty it was to attend the auto, there was no
coverage. The loss occurred while the plaintiff's car was parked in a public garage
attended by an employee of that garage. The Court held, a prima facie case had
been established by application of the rule that facts adduced at the trial are to be
considered in the aspect most favorable to the plaintiff, who is entitled to every
favorable inference which can reasonably be drawn from those facts.40 Thus, they
reversed the Appellate Division47 (which found the jury verdict to be against the
weight of the evidence and dismissed the complaint) and granted a new trial.
The two dissenters felt that no evidence raising a question of fact had been
presented, so a dismissal was proper 48, this in spite of the Appellate Division's
wording that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. They would have
dismissed the complaint having found as a matter of law that the trial court com-
mitted error in failing to grant defendant's motions for dismissal of the complaint
and directed verdict.
Res Adjudicafa
Where access to premises was ordered by mandatory injunction against tenant,
a later suit by the landlord for damages arising out of the same transaction was
barred as res adjudicata.49 The rule is that where a cause of action has been finally
adjudicated on its merits, it is final as to all matters which might have been litigated
as well as those actually litigated.5 0 Since plaintiff could have demanded damages
in the injunction action, he was precluded from a suit for damages in a later
action.51 This follows from the fact that the distinction between law and equity
has been abolished in this state;52 this was a "violation of but one right by a single
legal wrong. 53
45. 307 N. Y. 584, 123 N. E. 2d 79 (1955).
46. Osipoff v. Cityj of New York, 286 N. Y. 422, 36 N. E. 2d 646 (1941); DeWald
v. Seidenberg, 297 N. Y. 335, 79 N. E. 2d 430 (1948).
47. 283 App. Div. 859, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 900 (Ist Dep't 1954).
48. DeWald v. Seidenberg, note 46 supra.
49. Mafio Holding Corp. v. S. J. Blume Inc., 308 N. Y. 570, 127 N. E. 2d 558(1955).
50. Schuycill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg R. Corp., 250 N. Y. 304, 165 N. E.
456 (1929).
51. Interlied v Whaley, 85 Hun. 63, 32 N. Y. Supp. 640 (4th Dep't 1895); aff'd.,
156 N. Y. 658, 50 N. E. 1118 (1898); HahZ v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135(1901).
52. Civil Practice Act §8.
53. DeCross v. Turner & Blanchard Inc., 267 N. Y. 207, 211; 196 N. E. 28, 30
(1935).
THE COUT OV APPEALS, 194 TERM
The Court also held that another cause of action for accrued rent, and expenses
and attorney's fees incurred in collecting the rent (a clause for such assessment
being part of the leasehold agreement) was not barred as res adjudicata by the
prior injunction action. This cause of action is based on the refusal of the tenant
to pay additional rent rather than a refusal to allow access to the premises. The
court maintained defendant's refusals showed a violation of two rights by two
distinct legal wrongs. The New York rule is that no suit for future rent can be
brought in the absence of an acceleration clause,5 4 and since the amount of plain-
tiff's expense could not be ascertained until the conclusion of the injunction suit,
it followed that an action to recover such rent is not barred by a judgment in a
previous action.5r
Deposit in Lieu of Bail
New York Civil Practice Act §859, which governs the disposition of deposits
in lieu of bail, is divisible into a discretionary and a mandatory clause. Distribution
under the former comes into operation only where there is an arrest pursuant to a
court order under New York Civil Practice Act §827. In any other arrest situ-
ation,50 the distribution is mandatory.
Defendant husband was arrested pursuant to a court order under Civil Prac-
tice Act §827, and his wife made application to have the money he deposited in
lieu of bail applied in partial satisfaction of a judgment for accrued alimony and
counsel fees. The Court held, that the special term had no power as a matter of
law to direct payment of money so deposited pursuant to such an arrest in satis-
faction of a money judgment for alimony arrears antedating his arrest, where the
defendant had at all times kept himself amenable to the court process.57
Although it has been held that money so deposited by a third person can be
used to satisfy a judgment,58 (a fortiori if deposited by the defendant rather than
by a third person) the decision is not surprising in the light of earlier cases which
recognized the distinction between the two clauses. Subernick v. Subernick59 held
that the sole purpose of bail in a matrimonial action is to" insure the husband's
presence in court so that the court may enforce its orders in an authorized manner.
Recourse may not be had to bail under Civil Practice Act §859 for payment of
54. Mcready v. Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 400, 65 N. E. 208 (1902).
55. Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N. Y. 661, 11 N. E. 2d 209 (1953).
56. E.g., New York Civil Practice Act §826.
57. Chancer v. Chancer, 308 N. Y. 204, 124 N. E. 2d 283 (1955).
58. Lichter v. Raff, 149 Misc. 53, 266 N. Y. Supp. 748 (1933) (arrest here under
C. P. A. §826).
59. 123 Misc. 174, 204 N. Y. Supp. 437 (1924); Cf.' Wesenberg v. McCormack,
110 Misc. 775, 198 N. Y. Supp. 340, 341 (1922).
